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The Sixth Circuit Dropped the Ball: An Analysis of 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Ass’n in Light of the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Trends in State Action Jurisprudence 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If you ask any junior high or high school student what they most 
like about school, a significant number of them will unblinkingly re-
spond, “Playing sports.”1 For the most part, this is a uniquely Ameri-
can phenomenon because, unlike many countries where organized 
sports “are tied to community-based athletic clubs,” organized 
sports in the United States are primarily tied to schools.2 These 
schools, in turn, have ties to the state, and it is from actions by the 
state that students are protected by the Constitution. 
The Constitution is limited, however, in its ability to shield state-
sponsored interscholastic sports. Despite the best contentions of 
“Johnny or Jane,” their parents, or their coaches that “Johnny and 
Jane” have a right to play football or cheer for the squad, no court 
has ever recognized such a right. In fact, all federal circuit courts that 
have considered this contention have consistently held that there is 
no such thing as a constitutional right to participate in interscholastic 
athletics.3 Furthermore, because high school athletics are inextricably 
tied to the several states’ education programs and not to any federal 
program, it is state law and policy, rather than constitutional or fed-
eral law, which guides these programs. Therefore, the only effective 
way a person can make out a federal issue when attempting to pro-
tect their school “sports rights” is either through the indirect path of 
 
 1. See generally FRANK L. SMOLL & RONALD E. SMITH, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN 
SPORT: A BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 37–39 (1996) (noting participation rates in inter-
scholastic athletics by sport, gender, age, and race). 
 2. ROBERT S. GRIFFIN, SPORTS IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: 
SUCCESS ON THE FIELD AND IN LIFE 69 (1998). 
 3. See, e.g., Alerding v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 779 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1985); 
Niles v. Tex. Univ. Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983); Hebert v. Ven-
tetuolo, 638 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981); Moreland v. W. Pa. Athletic Ass’n, 572 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 
1978); Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976). 
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the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment4 to the 
states or through the Civil Rights Act of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 It must 
be emphasized that the individual rights and liberties that the Con-
stitution and its amendments protect apply only to “state actions” 
or, in other words, only to the actions of any federal, state, or local 
government.6 To put it another way, neither the Constitution nor 
any of its amendments provides any protections against private con-
duct no matter how unfair or egregious that conduct may be7 unless 
that action can be traced back to some source of state action. 
Recently, the Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee’s Secondary 
School Athletic Association (“TSSAA”), which traditionally makes all 
of the rules and guidelines that govern high school athletics for that 
state, is not a state actor.8 This is groundbreaking. Every federal cir-
cuit court and every state’s highest court that has ever entertained 
the issue of whether state high school athletic associations are state 
actors has nodded in the affirmative.9 Therefore, these athletic asso-
ciations have always had to scrupulously watch that they do not step 
 
 4. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Furthermore, whether an aggrieved party seeks a remedy under either the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or under § 1983, any court’s “state action” analysis is the same because “[t]he ‘under 
color of law’ in Section 1983 means the same as the ‘state action’ requirement under the Four-
teenth Amendment.” See Pearson v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. IP 99-1857-C-T/G, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11913, at *17 n.6 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2000); see also United States v. 
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966), overruling recognized in Gresham Park Cmty. Org. v. 
Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 6. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 758 (3d ed. 1999). 
 7. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The one exception being the Thir-
teenth Amendment, “which abolishes the institution of slavery, [and which] is directed [] to 
controlling the actions of private individuals.” ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 758. 
 8. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766 
(6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000), rev’d, No. 99-901, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 
964 (Feb. 20, 2001). 
 9. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 190 F.3d 705, 706–
07 (6th Cir. 1999), denying reh’g to 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999). 
16DREW.DOC 1/3/02  2:50 PM 
1313] The Sixth Circuit Dropped the Ball 
 1315 
on anyone’s constitutional toes—always until now. The Brentwood 
decision has set off a tremor in this formerly stable area of state ac-
tion law. 
Although the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood court understandably 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s relevant state action cases to effec-
tively limit, if not eliminate, finding state action in the actions of 
many private entities, the Sixth Circuit went too far when it held that 
the actions of the TSSAA are not state actions. Consequently, this 
decision unduly expands the several states’ legal authority, through 
their athletic associations to slight, if not trample, the constitutional 
protections traditionally afforded students and schools engaged in 
states’ interscholastic athletic programs. 
First and foremost, this Note discusses why the Sixth Circuit 
wandered off the state actor charts in its Brentwood holding. Part II 
provides the necessary background for understanding the Brentwood 
court’s analysis by explicating (1) the three prominent tests in the 
“state actor” field; (2) the pivotal Blum Trilogy of cases; and (3) the 
other federal circuits’ respectively unanimous holdings that state in-
terscholastic athletic associations are state actors. Part III examines 
the factual specifics that underlie the Brentwood decision. Part IV 
focuses on the Brentwood court’s analysis, particularly the court’s 
troubling analysis rooted in its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
Tarkanian Footnote 13. Part V critiques not only the Brentwood 
court’s analysis but also calls for a re-examination of the Supreme 
Court’s recent analysis in this area of state action. Part V also offers a 
solution on how to correct this area of the law, which, of late, has 
elevated form over substance. Part VI offers a brief synthesis, and be-
cause the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Brentwood back to 
the Sixth Circuit while this Note neared the final phases of the edit-
ing process prior to publication, Part VII provides a necessary post-
script, though certainly not the last word in this gapingly gray area of 
constitutional law.10 
 
 10. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 99-901, 2001 
U.S. LEXIS 964 (Feb. 20, 2001). Although the Supreme Court’s decision ultimately decided 
some of the narrower issues pertinent only to the Brentwood case, the 5-4 Court, if anything, 
continued to muddy the waters of state action jurisprudence. See infra Parts V and VII. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court began applying the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the states with the Civil Rights Cases.11 In these cases, the Court’s 
majority held that restricting Blacks from accessing public accommo-
dations or public conveyances is not unconstitutional because it is 
merely a harm between private persons; therefore, there is no consti-
tutional remedy.12 In some instances where a person’s constitutional 
rights or liberties have been harmed, it is clear that the alleged 
wrongdoer is (or is not) a state actor and, therefore, it is clear 
whether the courts may (or may not) afford a remedy. However, the 
governmental status of the wrongdoer is frequently unclear, despite 
claims that it is a non-state actor and, therefore, incapable of violat-
ing the Constitution.13 Over the course of the recent century, the 
Supreme Court has developed the following tests to determine 
whether these seemingly private actors may actually be ascribed as 
state actors: (1) the Public Function14 test; (2) the Nexus15 test; and 
(3) the Mutual Contacts16 test.17 
 
 11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See David J. Pierguidi, Note, Absent Strong Connections to a 
State Government, a High School Athletic Association Cannot Be Construed as a State Actor: 
Brentwood v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. 
granted, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000), 10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 457, 458–59 (2000). 
 12. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 766–67. 
 13. See id. at 759. 
 14. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 371 (1974); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501, 506–07 (1946). 
 15. Or state compulsion/coercion test. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 
(1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 456 U.S. 922, 941 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
 16. Or licensing, symbiotic, subsidies, “catch-all,” or other joint action or entanglement 
test. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 796–817. Mutual contacts is really Nowak and 
Rotunda’s “catch-all” category for all the various direct and indirect means the Supreme Court 
has used to determine the level of relationship between so-called private actors and the state. 
See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972). 
 17. The author has chosen these italicized state action test labels because many legal 
scholars in the field prefer them. Moreover, the author has not placed the additional state ac-
tion labels in the footnotes to confuse the reader but to provide a sample list of synonymous 
names and descriptions that may connect with many readers. 
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A. A Brief Preview of the State Action Tests 
1. The Public Function test 
When using the public function test to determine whether a 
seemingly private actor has assumed state actor status, the courts 
consider whether the private actor’s activity is one that government 
has traditionally done (e.g., holding elections).18 For example, in 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,19 a private utility company ter-
minated a woman’s electrical service.20 She called state action theory 
into play when she noted that the state licensed this private utility to 
have a statewide monopoly, and she further noted that since the util-
ity company had failed to provide any notice or hearing regarding 
the termination of her utilities, her rights to due process had been 
abused.21 The Supreme Court used the Public Function test to limit 
such an extension of state action upon licensed monopolies when it 
stated that only activities that were traditionally reserved to state au-
thority (e.g., education, fire and police protection, tax collection, 
etc.) fall within the ambit of public function.22 
2. The Nexus test 
Under this test, the Supreme Court measures the quantity and 
quality of a governmental entity’s encouragement, coercion, and di-
rection aimed at a private entity.23 For example, in Shelley v. 
Kraemer,24 state courts held enforceable the restrictive covenants that 
prevented minority Blacks from owning certain homes.25 The Su-
preme Court later rejected this reasoning and held that the state 
courts had, in effect, encouraged or directed racial discrimination26 
and thereby violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.27 As this Note contemplates, the Court has recently been in-
 
 18. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 764. 
 19. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
 20. See id. at 347. 
 21. See id. at 347–48. 
 22. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1978). 
 23. See Pierguidi, supra note 11, at 460–61. 
 24. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 25. See id. at 4–8. 
 26. See id. at 19–20. 
 27. See id. at 23; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 785–86; see also Pierguidi, 
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creasingly unwilling to find the requisite nexus between state entities 
and private entities.28 
3. The Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” tests 
Under this type of analysis, the Court basically examines the 
number and type of relationships between the state and the alleged 
wrongdoer.29 Specifically, the Court, on a case-by-case basis, weighs 
such items as (1) state licensing and regulation of the private entity; 
(2) state subsidies or aid to the private entity; (3) the amount of 
“symbiosis” or “entanglement” between the state and the private en-
tity; and (4) the amount of “joint action” attributable to the state 
and the private entity.30 
Perhaps the best example of applying these “catch-all” tests oc-
curs in the Blum Trilogy31 itself and its wake of subsequent cases. In 
the next section, this Note will examine the Blum Trilogy cases one 
at a time; therefore, the reader may more appropriately note the ap-
plication of this Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” test momentarily. 
Suffice it here to say that Blum essentially established a high-water 
mark under this third test (and arguably under the second or Nexus 
test). It is this high-water mark that undoubtedly paved the way for 
the Brentwood court to stray from the unanimity32 of state supreme 
court and federal circuit court decisions which held that state high 
school athletic associations were state actors; and which, until 
Brentwood, uniformly triggered all of the implications and ramifica-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 onto state inter-
scholastic athletics programs. 
 
supra note 11, at 461. 
 28. See Pierguidi, supra note 11, at 461–62; see also infra Part V.A (discussing the sig-
nificance of the Blum Trilogy and its aftermath). 
 29. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 796. 
 30. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). These cases have become col-
lectively known as the Blum Trilogy. See infra Part II.B.1–3 for a more in-depth analysis of the 
Blum Trilogy cases. 
 32. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758 (6th 
Cir. 1999), reh’g denied, 190 F.3d 705, 706 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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B. THE BLUM TRILOGY 
To understand the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Brentwood, it is 
useful to consider the analysis followed in the Blum Trilogy, upon 
which the Brentwood Court relied heavily. The Blum Trilogy itself 
does not directly address state athletic association issues. This trilogy, 
however, is essentially the Supreme Court’s latest word on state ac-
tion law. As will be ultimately evident, the Blum Trilogy, when ex-
amined on a general level of abstraction, stands for the proposition 
that the Supreme Court is increasingly reluctant to find “state ac-
tion” even though the Court may have more easily done so under its 
previous tests. 
1. Blum 
In Blum v. Yaretsky,33 a class of Medicaid patients in private New 
York nursing homes challenged whether they could be “demoted” 
from skilled care to standard care facilities without any form of due 
process or hearing.34 The Supreme Court considered the issue of 
whether the state of New York may be held responsible for the deci-
sion to “demote” or downgrade the status of these patients’ care.35 
Despite the extensive regulatory overlap between decision-making 
physicians and New York’s bureaucratic implementation of Medi-
caid,36 and despite the fact that the state subsidized more than 90% 
of the care of the Medicaid patients in these care facilities,37 the 
Court held that these nursing homes were not acting under the in-
fluence of the state, and therefore were not state actors.38 
 
 33. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
 34. See id. at 993. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. at 1004. 
 37. See id. at 1011. 
 38. See id. at 1012. The Court’s majority arrived at this conclusion because “demoting” 
the Medicaid patients’ standard of care “ultimately turn[ed] on medical judgments made by 
private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State.” Id. at 
1008. The dissenting opinion determined, however, that in this case the physician’s role is far 
from independent and is, in fact, relegated to simply that of a “scorer,” tabulating the neces-
sary care according to predetermined standards established by the state. See id. at 1022–23 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further added that these predetermined state stan-
dards that expeditiously “demote” Medicaid patients’ level of care are, indeed, less about what 
the majority terms professional “decisionmaking” and more about the state’s desire to save 
money. See id. at 1014–15. In Blum, therefore, the dissent not only conceptually notes that 
16DREW.DOC 1/3/02  2:50 PM 




In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,39 Kohn, the director at a private 
school for troubled youth, fired one vocational counselor and five 
teachers when these faculty members supported a joint student-staff 
proposal for changes at the school.40 Ms. Rendell-Baker (and the 
others) alleged that they had been dismissed without due process be-
cause she had simply exercised her First Amendment speech rights.41 
Of course, at issue in this case was whether a private school, which 
derives most of its income from the public and which is regulated by 
the public, is a state actor when it discharges its employees.42 
Basically following the same three tests outlined above,43 the 
Court first rejected state actor status under the Public Function test 
because education is not an exclusive prerogative of the state where 
private schools have often fulfilled this public need.44 
Moving directly to the Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” test, this 
Court’s same Blum majority held that significant subsidies and heavy 
regulation are not enough to confer state actor status. Just as the 
nursing home in Blum received significant state subsidies,45 Kohn’s 
school received 90 to 99% of its funds from the state.46 Not only did 
the Court dismiss this potential “entanglement,” the Rendell-Baker 
Court’s majority clearly limited the Mutual Contacts test when it de-
clared that just because a private entity depends on state contracts to 
build roads, dams, ships, etc. for the government does not make that 
private entity a state actor.47 
Justice Marshall, in dissent, took issue with this limitation of the 
Mutual Contacts approach and volleyed back that this school, unlike 
 
form has been elevated over substance, but concretely advances the argument that state forms 
themselves have been elevated over the substance of what is materially going on in these nurs-
ing homes. 
 39. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
 40. See id. at 831. 
 41. See id. at 834. 
 42. See id. at 831. 
 43. See supra Part II.A.1–3. 
 44. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. 
 45. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 46. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840–41. 
 47. See id. 
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the majority’s state-contracted construction work, is much more 
closely regulated and, furthermore, that this school is performing a 
statutory duty of the state.48 Justice Marshall conceded that under 
this Mutual Contacts test, perhaps the subsidy money and heavy 
regulatory schemes in and of themselves may not be enough, but 
taken together with several other indicia of state action in the same 
factual circumstances,49 the case merits more than mere lip service to 
the Mutual Contacts test. In sum, Marshall stated that the majority’s 
decision appeared to signal “a return to empty formalism in state ac-
tion doctrine.”50 
3. Lugar 
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil,51 Edmondson Oil, to recover on a 
debt, sought a prejudgment attachment against Lugar. The clerk 
subsequently issued the writ of attachment, which the county sheriff 
executed.52 Lugar sued under § 1983 because Edmondson “had 
acted jointly with the state [the court and its officers] to deprive him 
of his property without due process of law.”53 The Supreme Court 
held that this joint action caused the county court to be a state ac-
tor.54 Considering the narrowness of this decision’s applicable hold-
ing (i.e., exclusive to prejudgment attachments), not even this case’s 
outcome—that the Court’s majority actually found state action 
where a private actor had acted55—really appears relevant for evaluat-
ing many subsequent state action cases. 
C. Status Quo of the Federal Circuits Prior to Brentwood 
After the Sixth Circuit held that the TSSAA is not a state actor 
and subsequently denied rehearing, Justice Merritt of that circuit 
understandably lamented that what had been crystal clear in the law 
 
 48. See id. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 49. See id. at 848 n.1. 
 50. See id. at 852. 
 51. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
 52. See id. at 924–25. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 941–42. 
 55. See id. In sum, under a “joint participation” element of the Mutual Contacts test, 
the Court held that when the County Clerk and Sheriff acted on Edmondson Oil’s prejudg-
ment attachment, the state acted “jointly” with a private person to take away Lugar’s property 
without due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. 
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was now clouded.56 Specifically, Merritt did not understand how his 
court could reasonably deny a petition for an en banc rehearing 
when he considered that each and every circuit that had ever in-
quired as to whether state high school interscholastic athletic associa-
tions were state actors had, in fact, held that they were. And what 
troubled him most about his fellow justices’ denial of rehearing was 
that they had “created an unnecessary conflict in the circuits on an 
important question of constitutional law . . . [which] will have to be 
remedied now by the Supreme Court.”57 
Prior to the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood decision, all other federal 
circuits consistently held that high school interscholastic athletic as-
sociations were state actors.58 The following is a sampling of how 
some of these circuits reached their respective conclusions that state 
athletic associations are indeed state actors. For the most part, these 
circuit cases stand for the proposition that holding state interscholas-
tic athletic associations as state actors was essentially a foregone con-
clusion. No circuit seriously entertained the possibility that these as-
sociations were anything but state actors. 
1. Foregone conclusion analysis among the circuits 
In the Seventh Circuit’s Griffin High School v. Illinois High 
School Ass’n,59 Griffin, a private religious school, sued the state ath-
letic association under § 1983, alleging the Illinois High School As-
sociation (“IHSA”) “discriminated against private schools in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”60 Griffin based its contention upon a 
 
 56. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, reh’g en banc denied, 
190 F.3d 705, 706–07 (6th Cir. 1999) (Merritt, J., dissenting). In particular, Merritt asserted 
that the Sixth Circuit was essentially acting irresponsibly because this circuit’s holding (1) con-
tradicted uniform case law; (2) contradicted the clearly established constitutional theory of 
“state action” held in all other circuits and all state supreme courts; and (3) trounced (poten-
tially) the expectations of how almost all fifty states should conduct their high school inter-
scholastic athletic associations. Id. at 706. 
 57. Id. at 707–08 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has since granted certio-
rari. See 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000). 
 58. See, e.g., Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 
1987); In re United States ex rel. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 682 F.2d 147, 151 
(8th Cir. 1982); Moreland v. W. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic League, 572 F.2d 121, 125 (3d 
Cir. 1978); Okla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1963). 
 59. 822 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 60. Id. at 672–73. 
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new student transfer rule, which enabled high school athletes to 
transfer from private schools to public schools with impunity, but 
which compelled athletes that transferred from public schools to pri-
vate schools to sit out one whole year before being eligible to play.61 
The court upheld the transfer rule under its rational basis test.62 Of 
course, for this court to reach its rational basis analysis, it first enter-
tained the pertinent issue of whether the IHSA was a state actor.63 
Apparently both parties conceded this issue because neither party 
disputed whether IHSA was a state actor,64 and the court essentially, 
like so much of its prior precedent, “assum[ed] without deciding the 
question, that the IHSA [was] an arm of the state for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes” because “the overwhelming public nature of 
the IHSA membership [was] sufficient to confer state action . . . .”65 
The Eighth Circuit’s case of In re United States ex rel. Missouri 
State High School Activities Ass’n66 is another high school athlete 
transfer rule case.67 Furthermore, just as the Seventh Circuit held 
IHSA a state actor, this court simply held that the Missouri State 
High School Activities Association (“MSHSAA”) was a state actor 
“[b]ecause MSHSAA [was] an association comprised primarily of 
public schools, its rules [were] state action governed by the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment.”68 
2. A hint of change 
By the early 1990s, one circuit hinted at a potential shift. The 
Fifth Circuit’s case of Habetz v. Louisiana High School Athletic 
 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. at 675. A discussion of such would be beyond the scope of this Note. 
 63. See id. at 674. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 67. See id. at 149–50. 
 68. Id. at 151. The Tenth Circuit’s Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass’n v. Bray, 321 
F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963), is yet another high school athlete transfer rule case that required 
the Tenth Circuit court to determine whether the Oklahoma High School Athletic Association 
(“OHSAA”) was a state actor for purposes of Bray’s § 1983 suit. See id. at 273. Although the 
court conceded that the OHSAA is a voluntary association, created by contract of its compos-
ite schools rather than legislation, its rules still “ring with authority and are enforced as against 
an individual in the name of the public interest, under color of the laws of the State of Okla-
homa . . . .” Id. 
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Ass’n69 probably provides the best hint of a bridge between the fed-
eral circuits’ past practice of consistently holding that state high 
school athletic associations were state actors and the Sixth Circuit’s 
current break from the pack with Brentwood. In Habetz, a female 
high school student desired to play on the baseball team, but she was 
forbidden due to a Louisiana High School Athletic Association 
(“LHSAA”) rule, which prevented girls from playing on boys’ 
teams.70 Actually, only attorney’s fees were at issue in this case71 be-
cause the girl’s claim became moot when the LHSSA amended its 
rule, thereby allowing “a girl to participate in boys sports if the par-
ticular school does not offer a comparable girls sport [e.g., If no 
girl’s softball is offered, then girls may play baseball].”72 Since the 
plaintiff’s case-in-chief—which consisted of § 1983 and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims—was no longer at issue, the court did not need 
to decide whether the LHSSA was a state actor. The court, however, 
noted that the district court had determined that the LHSAA was 
not a “state actor” when it applied the Blum Trilogy’s “fairly attrib-
utable” theory.73 The court foreshadowed the Brentwood court’s 
problematic dealing with Tarkanian74 footnote 13 when it declared, 
“[w]hether St. Augustine75 remains controlling in this circuit after 
[the Blum Trilogy], and Tarkanian and its footnote 13 is a question 
we need not decide.”76 After hinting at a potential gap in recent state 
actor precedent, the Fifth Circuit dodged this one. But ten years 
later, the Sixth Circuit picked up where the Fifth Circuit left off and 
blazed into uncharted state actor jurisprudence. 
III. BRENTWOOD ACADEMY 
Because the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association 
(“TSSAA”) has a recruiting rule that prohibits TSSAA member 
schools from “[t]he use of undue influence . . . to secure or retain a 
 
 69. 915 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 70. See id. at 165. Of course, mixed doubles in tennis was excepted. Id. 
 71. See id. at 167. 
 72. Id. at 165. 
 73. See id. at 166–67. 
 74. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); see infra Part IV.B. 
 75. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 
1968) (holding that LHSAA was a state actor). This case was arguably cited as persuasive 
precedent by the Supreme Court in Tarkanian’s footnote 13. See infra Part IV.B.3.a. 
 76. Habetz, 915 F.2d at 167. 
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student for athletic purposes,”77 Brentwood Academy alleged 
(among other claims) that the TSSAA had violated its First Amend-
ment78 right to free speech as incorporated upon the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.79 Before the court, therefore, could address 
the merits of Brentwood’s claims, the court had to first determine 
the issue of whether the TSSAA was a state actor.80 
A. The Events Leading up to the Lawsuit 
Brentwood Academy is a private Christian school located in 
Brentwood, Tennessee.81 Brentwood is considered to be what is 
commonly regarded as a high school “football powerhouse.”82 
Brentwood has been nationally ranked by USA Today, it has com-
piled a 310-43 record over the past twenty-eight years (as of March 
1998), and it has racked up seven state championship titles.83 
The other party to this action, the TSSAA, was incorporated in 
1925 as a voluntary association84 to oversee interscholastic athletic 
programs in Tennessee’s secondary schools. By the late 1990’s, 290 
public schools and fifty-five private schools comprised TSSAA’s 
membership.85 
In 1997, various rival coaches, apparently tired of both losing 
and of the bitterness of sour grapes, alleged that Brentwood had vio-
lated some TSSAA rules.86 TSSAA investigated and found (among 
other infractions) that the Brentwood football coach had sent a letter 
to already-accepted, incoming ninth graders to join the team’s spring 
practice while in the eighth grade.87 According to TSSAA, this action 
 
 77. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 761 
(6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000), rev’d, No. 99-901, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 
964 (Feb. 20, 2001) (citing TSSAA Bylaws, art. II, § 21). 
 78. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 79. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 80. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 760. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. at 762. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. at 760. 
 87. See id. at 760–61. The TSSAA also found that the Brentwood football coach had 
provided free tickets to a Brentwood football game for a middle school coach and two middle 
school athletes. TSSAA’s penalty for this violation of the “recruiting rule” was not a contested 
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itself violated the TSSAA’s “recruiting rule” which states: 
The use of undue influence on a student (with or without an ath-
letic record), his or her parents or guardians of a student by any 
person, connected or not connected, with the school to secure or 
retain a student for athletic purposes shall be a violation of the re-
cruiting rule.88 
By August of 1997, TSSAA declared (1) that Brentwood, as a re-
sult of violating these rules, would be ineligible to participate in 
TSSAA football and basketball tournaments for one year, and (2) 
that all Brentwood programs would be on probation for two years.89 
Naturally, Brentwood appealed this decision as part of TSSAA’s in-
ternal appeals process. But, by the end of Brentwood’s second ap-
peal, TSSAA actually increased Brentwood’s penalties. TSSAA de-
clared (1) that Brentwood would be ineligible to participate in 
tournaments for two years, (2) that all Brentwood programs would 
be on probation for four years, and (3) that Brentwood would pay a 
fine of $3000.90 
At this juncture, a critical point must be clarified. Under its “re-
cruiting rule,” TSSAA is not punishing Brentwood Academy for 
holding a football spring practice (which it could do under the 
TSSAA rules), but rather punishing the program because the football 
coach contacted the already admitted, incoming freshman to let 
them know just when that legitimate spring practice program would 
begin. As the district court found, Brentwood’s true violation lay in 
Brentwood Academy’s football coach’s, or rather Coach Flatt’s invi-
tation91 to attend the football practice, not in the practice itself. Fur-
 
issue in Brentwood’s future state action lawsuit. The TSSAA further found that the basketball 
coach had impermissibly held an off-season practice. However, because that coach had violated 
the “off-season practice rule” rather than the “recruiting rule,” it did not implicate any First 
Amendment free speech rights, which Brentwood attempted to vindicate with its lawsuit 
against the TSSAA. Id.  
 88. Id. at 761 (citing TSSAA Bylaws, art. II, § 21). 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. The full text of the invitation reads: 
Having officially enrolled at Brentwood Academy, the TSSAA allows you to partici-
pate in spring football practice. If you are not currently involved in a sport at your 
school, we would like to invite you to practice with your new team. Equipment will 
be given out April 30th at 3:30 downstairs in the locker room. 
Spring practice will begin May 1, 1997 and conclude on May 14, 1997. Practice be-
gins at 3:30 and will be finished by 4:45. Due to the inconvenience to your parents, 
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thermore, Coach Flatt’s subsequent telephone calls to students, 
which were prompted by a parent’s concerned inquiry about what to 
do if his child’s middle school activity conflicted with Brentwood’s 
spring football practice, further violated the “recruiting rule” even 
though the substance of Coach Flatt’s telephone message actually 
discouraged the boys from attending practice if it in any way con-
flicted with activities at their respective middle schools.92 
B. Brentwood Files Suit 
On December 12, 1997, Brentwood, after exhausting the 
TSSAA’s appeals process, filed suit against TSSAA.93 Brentwood 
sought injunctive relief against enforcement of the TSSAA’s “recruit-
ing rule” primarily because it allegedly violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.94 
Brentwood’s § 1983 claim charged that TSSAA’s “recruiting rule” 
deprived Brentwood of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
under color of state law95 because the TSSAA, as an alleged state ac-
tor, prohibited Brentwood’s football coach from communicating to 
Brentwood’s incoming freshman and punished the program for 
sending a letter to and telephoning these incoming freshman. The 
United States District Court granted summary judgment to Brent-
wood when it held that the TSSAA’s “recruiting rule,” on its face, 
violated the First Amendment.96 TSSAA, arguing that it was not a 
state actor for purposes of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
brought this appeal to the Sixth Circuit.97 
 
please do not feel that you must attend every practice. However, I do feel that get-
ting involved as soon as possible would definitely be to your advantage. 
In the near future, you will receive a letter outlining our summer workout program. 
If you have any questions, please call me at school 373-0611 x 119, or at home 
373-0475. We are certainly glad that you decided to become an Eagle. 
Your Coach, 
/s/ Carlton Flatt 
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 676 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, No. 99-901, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964 
(Feb. 20, 2001). 
 92. Id. at 676. Coach Flatt chose to individually “telephone the students because there 
was not enough time before the start of spring practice to send another letter.” Id. 
 93. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 761. 
 94. See id. See supra note 5 for pertinent text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 95. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 761. 
 96. See Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 695. 
 97. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 761. 
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C. TSSAA Appeals 
Maintaining the district court’s holding of state action, therefore, 
was critical to Brentwood Academy in TSSAA’s appeal to the Sixth 
Circuit because the Fourteenth and First Amendments and “§1983 
erect[] no shield against merely private conduct, no matter how dis-
criminatory or wrongful.”98 In other words, “[t]o prevail on a First 
Amendment claim, [Brentwood] must first make a showing that 
[TSSAA] is a ‘state actor.’”99 
In order to determine whether TSSAA is a “state actor,” the 
Sixth Circuit must first analyze the TSSAA itself before looking to 
binding and precedential rules of law. The Sixth Circuit essentially 
found the following seven core factors regarding TSSAA’s character-
istics to aid in its determination of whether TSSAA was a state actor: 
(1) TSSAA was founded in 1925 as a voluntary association; (2) 
TSSAA was composed of 290 public and 55 private schools; (3) 
TSSAA’s administrative authority consisted of nine elected Board of 
Control members (elected by member schools) who are either school 
principals or superintendents, and at all times relevant to this case, 
these nine elected board members all came from public schools; (4) 
TSSAA received no state funding, rather all of its revenues came 
from tournament gate receipts; (5) TSSAA scheduled only tourna-
ments and not the state’s majority of athletic contests, and in fact, 
when the TSSAA scheduled tournaments at public (e.g. school) fa-
cilities, TSSAA entered into a paying contract with the state to do so; 
(6) nothing in the Tennessee Code authorized the state to conduct 
interscholastic events or empowered the TSSAA to do so;100 and fi-
nally (7) membership in TSSAA was voluntary.101 
The sixth factor listed above—the Tennessee State Board of 
Education’s 1972 “designation” to conduct interscholastic events—
received greater attention in the district court than in the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s review. This is consistent with that district court’s approach of 
weighing substance and with the Sixth Circuit’s approach of weigh-
ing form. To illustrate, the district court found it significant that in 
 
 98. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
 99. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 761–62. 
 100. In spite of the seeming lack of authority, the Tennessee State Board of Education 
“designated” TSSAA to conduct interscholastic events from 1972 until 1995, when this “des-
ignation” was repealed. See id. 
 101. See id. at 762. 
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1972, the Tennessee State Board of Education, clearly a “state ac-
tor,” designated TSSAA as “the organization to supervise and regu-
late the athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high 
schools of Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis.”102 The 
district court, furthermore, deemed it significant that from 1972 un-
til 1993, the Tennessee State Board of Education, itself, reviewed 
and approved TSSAA rules on several occasions and even found op-
portunity to review the “recruiting rule.”103 Finally, the district court 
noted that the 1995 Tennessee State Board of Education suspi-
ciously repealed its “designation” of TSSAA as the organization 
regulating interscholastic athletics in the wake of Tennessee lawsuits 
continually holding that the TSSAA is a state actor.104 Again, the dis-
trict court noted that after 1995, the forms regarding the relation-
ship between the Tennessee State Board of Education had changed, 
but the district court accepted as material fact that the underlying 
substantive relationship remained the same.105 Of significant note, 
the Sixth Circuit did not address this issue in its de novo review. 
IV. BRENTWOOD ANALYSIS—BLUM TRILOGY FRAMEWORK IN 
ACTION 
After evaluating the facts, procedural history, and standard of re-
view, the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood court concluded that the TSSAA 
was clearly not a direct arm of the state and, therefore, plunged di-
rectly into Blum Trilogy application of the three general tests out-
lined above.106 The circuit court apparently determined that the 
Blum Trilogy lens would shed more light on these general “state ac-
tor” tests than its own, other circuits’, or even state supreme courts’ 
unanimous holdings that secondary school interscholastic athletic as-
sociations, such as the TSSAA, are state actors for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 analysis. 
 
 102. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 
(M.D. Tenn. 1998) (citing Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Rule 0520-1-2.26 (later moved to Rule 0520-
1-2.08)). 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. at 675, 681–82. See generally Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic 
Ass’n, 735 F. Supp. 753 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), aff’d, 908 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding the 
TSSAA to be a “state actor”); Graham v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:95-CV-
044, 1995 WL 115890 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 1995) (same). 
 105. See Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 681–82. 
 106. See supra Part II.A. 
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A. Analysis of the Sixth Circuit’s Application of the State Action 
Tests 
As noted, the Sixth Circuit recognized the three general state ac-
tion tests. The court, however, used different labels than the author 
has chosen.107 From its prior precedents, the court recognized (1) 
the Public Function test; (2) the Nexus [or state compul-
sion/coercion] test; and (3) the Mutual Contacts “catch-all” [or 
Symbiotic] test .108 
1. The Public Function test 
Under its conceptualization of the Public Function test, the 
court sought to determine whether “the private entity [TSSAA] ex-
ercised power which was traditionally exclusively reserved to the 
state, such as holding elections, or eminent domain.”109 In quick 
fashion, the court concluded that “neither the conduct nor the co-
ordination of amateur sports ha[d] been a traditional government 
function.”110 
2.  The Nexus test 
Next, the court delved into the Nexus [or state compul-
sion/coercion] test. Under this test, the court required that a party, 
such as Brentwood Academy, must “prove that the state has so co-
erced or encouraged a private entity to act that the choice of that en-
tity [TSSAA] must be regarded as the choice of the state.”111 When 
applying this test to the facts of Brentwood, the court unequivocally 
stated in abrupt conclusory fashion, “the state of Tennessee’s interac-
tion with TSSAA has been minimal,”112 even in light of the State 
Board of Education’s decision to no longer “designate” the TSSAA 
 
 107. the author chose to use labels noted in the main text rather than the bracketed labels 
the Sixth Circuit employs not to confuse the reader, but to be more consistent with the Su-
preme Court and leading scholars. 
 108. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 763 (6th 
Cir. 1995); see also Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 109. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 763 (quoting Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335). 
 110. Id. at 763 (quoting S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 
483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987) (first alteration in the original)). 
 111. Id. (citing Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335). 
 112. Id. 
16DREW.DOC 1/3/02  2:50 PM 
1313] The Sixth Circuit Dropped the Ball 
 1331 
to conduct interscholastic activities.113As noted above,114 this conclu-
sion flies in the face of the lower court’s conclusion that Tennessee 
and TSSAA have had significant interaction because, as a matter of 
undisputed fact, the Board of Education had reviewed and approved 
TSSAA rules.115 The lower court, in its view, characterized this recent 
Board of Education’s repeal of the TSSAA’s “designation” status as a 
reduction as to form, but not in substance.116 Subsequently, this dif-
ference in characterization led the lower court to hold that TSSAA 
even violated the Nexus test and not just the “catch-all” test;117 
whereas, the overturning circuit held that it had not.118 
Not only did the circuit court in Brentwood downplay the fac-
tual record, but it also analogized TSSAA’s athletic situation to that 
of a heavily regulated utility monopoly in Pennsylvania.119 Here, the 
court blatantly invoked an “apples and oranges” analogy. This is 
problematic because, first of all, the Metropolitan Edison120 case was 
fought on Public Function test grounds, which this court rightly de-
termined as inapplicable to the situation in Brentwood. Therefore, 
the court mixed inapplicable Public Function analysis with Nexus 
analysis. Secondly, the court disregarded the fact that Metropolitan 
Edison involved a monopoly experimentally engaging in public util-
ity services while Brentwood involved a monopoly engaging schools, 
which are obligated to fulfill their state’s statutorily educational du-
ties. 
 
 113. See id. 
 114. See supra Part III.C. 
 115. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 
681 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
 116. See id. (finding that the conduct of the Tennessee State Board of Education and 
TSSAA had not materially changed simply because the Board had reacted by “fixing” its “dele-
gation” language in the face of two recent district court cases that had also held the TSSAA to 
be a “state actor”); see also Pierguidi, supra note 11, at 470. See generally Crocker v. Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 735 F. Supp. 753 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Graham v. Tenn. Sec-
ondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:95-CV-044, 1995 WL 115890 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (refer-
ring to the two recent district court cases that held the TSSAA to be a “state actor”). 
 117. See Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 685. 
 118. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 764 
(6th Cir. 1995). 
 119. See id.; Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); supra Part II.A.1. 
 120. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
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3.  Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” test 
The Mutual Contacts “catch-all” [or Symbiotic] test, presents 
some challenges for the Sixth Circuit, especially in light of the Sixth 
Circuit’s cases which hold that these interscholastic athletic associa-
tions are state actors. The court, however, avoided these “control-
ling” precedent cases, which held interscholastic athletic associations 
as state actors, by relegating these cases to the status of dicta.121 In its 
analysis, the court essentially sidestepped the Mutual Contacts 
“catch-all” [Symbiotic] test when, rather than using this test’s catch-
all catch phrases such as state aid, state subsidies, regulation, entan-
glement, etc., the court simply restated the higher standard of the 
Nexus test’s language. Specifically, the court stated that to find state 
action, an athletic association such as TSSAA must be “controlled or 
directed by the state or its agencies. This, Brentwood has failed to do 
in the present case.”122 Controlling or directing actions are not stan-
dards under the Mutual Contacts test, but rather under the Nexus or 
coercion test.123 At least the Supreme Court’s dismissive analysis of 
the Mutual Contacts “catch-all” test in its Blum Trilogy remained 
true to that test’s traditional standard. Ultimately, after dodging its 
“controlling” state athletic association precedents and “applying” the 
three traditional state action tests, the Brentwood court was finally 
ready to address the Supreme Court’s only direct hint at how it 
would treat state athletic associations—Tarkanian’s hint in footnote 
13. 
 
 121. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 764–66 (distinguishing as mere dicta the prior state 
athletic association holdings of Burrows v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 891 F.2d 122, 125 
(6th Cir. 1989); Alerding v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 779 F.2d 315, 316 n.1 (6th Cir. 
1985); Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic 
Ass’n, 647 F.2d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
 122. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 764. Of worthy note, it would be quite oversimplistic to 
characterize the Sixth Circuit’s reversing the lower court’s holding that TSSAA is a “state ac-
tor” because the lower court failed to apply the Blum test. Significantly, the Sixth Circuit’s re-
versal appears to turn on its application of Blum to more selective factors; whereas the lower 
court listed a plethora of factors showing the entwined nature of the state and TSSAA and not-
ing that “[c]ertainly the conduct of the TSSAA and the State meet the ‘significant encourage-
ment’ and ‘fairly attributable’ [or, Nexus] tests of Blum.” Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 685. 
 123. See supra Part II.A.2–3. 
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B. Testing the Circuit’s Broad Dicta Brush of Tarkanian Footnote 
13 
In its last few sentences of analysis, the Brentwood court dis-
missed the Supreme Court’s statement in NCAA v. Tarkanian124 that 
a high school athletic association might be a state actor as pure dicta. 
1.  The footnote’s background 
In Tarkanian, Coach Tarkanian initially sued his employer—
University of Nevada Las Vegas (“UNLV”)—for firing him in viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when UNLV, at the NCAA’s behest, de-
prived him of his coaching position (or, in other words, deprived 
him of his property and liberty rights) without due process of law.125 
The NCAA became initially involved in this case’s circumstances af-
ter it found recruiting violations in Coach Tarkanian’s program.126 
Subsequently, the NCAA was joined as a necessary party to Tar-
kanian’s suit because the NCAA placed “constraints” on UNLV to 
clean up the Tarkanian program by clearing out Tarkanian himself.127 
Ultimately, a divided 5-4 United States Supreme Court reversed the 
Nevada Supreme Court’s holding that the NCAA was a state ac-
tor.128 More specifically, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA’s 
source institutions (public and private), which make and enforce its 
rules, do not act under color of Nevada state law. Rather the 
NCAA’s “collective membership[] speak[s] through an organization 
that is independent of any particular state.”129 
2.  Controversial text of footnote 13 itself 
Specifically, the Supreme Court’s majority qualified the last sen-
tence in the preceding paragraph by adding in a footnote that: 
 
 124. 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
 125. See id. at 187–90. 
 126. See id. at 184–87. 
 127. See id. at 186. 
 128. See id. at 199. 
 129. Id. at 193. Of course, on the other side of the Supreme Court’s narrow majority, 
the dissenters (and the Nevada Supreme Court) determined that UNLV’s adherence to NCAA 
rules and recommendations converted the NCAA into a state actor under a “jointly engaged” 
theory of either the Nexus or Mutual Contacts test. See id. Factually, however, the Majority 
claimed the upper hand on this so-called “jointly engaged” theory because, in reality, the 
NCAA and UNLV were at odds throughout this entire ordeal since UNLV wanted to keep 
Tarkanian, but the NCAA wanted him out. See id. at 196. 
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[t]he situation would, of course, be different if the membership 
consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State, 
many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign. 
See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Association, 695 F.2d 1126 
(CA9 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Louisiana High 
School Athletic Association v. St. Augustine High School, 396 
F.2d 224 (CA5 1968). The dissent apparently agrees that the 
NCAA was not acting under color of state law in its relationships 
with private universities, which constitute the bulk of its member-
ship. See post, at 202, n. 2.130 
3.  Two sentences at issue 
Footnote 13 may appropriately be best understood when it is 
broken into its two composite parts—sentence one with a supporting 
string cite and sentence two with a supporting reference to the dis-
sent’s opinion. 
a. Sentence one. As will be discussed later,131 the Brentwood 
court ignored the import of the relevant first sentence, which ad-
dresses the intrastate-association membership question. The court 
only narrowly addressed the irrelevant second sentence, which, in the 
interests of shorthand may be deemed the private-institution-as-
majority/joint action question. Notably, the court also chose to ig-
nore the import of the two supporting, favorably cited circuit court 
decisions which clearly held that state interscholastic athletic associa-
tions are state actors. 
For example, in the Supreme Court’s favorably cited case of Lou-
isiana High School Athletic Ass’n (“LHSAA”) v. St. Augustine High 
 
 130. Id. at 193 n.13 (1988). The dissent’s footnote 2 is as follows: 
The Court notes that the United States Courts of Appeals have, since our decisions 
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922 (1982), and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) [the Blum Trilogy], 
held unanimously that the NCAA is not a state actor. Ante, at 182 n.5. See McCor-
mack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (CA5 1988); Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 
258, 261 (CA6 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (CA6 1986); Arloso-
roff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021–1022 (CA4 1984). In none of those cases, 
however, did the courts address the theory before us here. E.g., McCormack, supra, 
at 1346. Indeed, in Arlosoroff, on which the subsequent decisions principally rely, 
the plaintiff was challenging the actions of Duke, a private university. The issue of 
joint action between the NCAA and a public university would never have arisen in 
that case. 
Id. at 202 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). 
 131. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
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School,132 St. Augustine, a private school comprised of black students 
sought to enjoin LHSAA’s practice of maintaining a “White” and 
“Negro” system of interscholastic athletic competition.133 The Fifth 
Circuit held that it had no substantial doubt that LHSAA actions are 
state actions because (1) 85% of LHSAA’s member schools are pub-
lic schools; (2) LHSAA received money from gate receipts; and (3) 
LHSAA’s events are held in state facilities, etc.134 
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit anticipated the argument that 
state athletic associations such as LHSAA do not impact private 
schools such as St. Augustine (or, by logical extension, to Brentwood 
Academy). Specifically, this court stated that St. Augustine’s status as 
a private school was immaterial because LHSAA elected to allow pri-
vate schools to participate in state activity, and, therefore, LHSAA, 
which “become[s] amenable to Fourteenth Amendment require-
ments[,]” must extend commensurate benefits consistent with con-
stitutional standards to private schools.135 
Finally, with the St. Augustine court perhaps anticipating the de-
sire for courts to succumb to the temptation to conservatively apply 
form over substance in this area of state actor jurisprudence, the 
court added that “for the state [of Louisiana] to devote so much 
time, energy, and other resources to interscholastic athletics and then 
to refer coordination of those activities to a separate body cannot ob-
scure the real and pervasive involvement of the state in the total pro-
gram.”136 
b. Sentence two. Rather than address that pertinent first sen-
tence, the Brentwood court, notably, zeroed in on the second sen-
tence of Tarkanian’s footnote 13.137 From the language of sentence 
two, the court seems to deem it significant “that even if an athletic 
association is a state actor when dealing with a public school, it ‘was 
not acting under color of state law in its relationships with private 
universities.’”138 As noted above, the Fifth Circuit, in its late 1960’s 
 
 132. 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 133. See id. at 225. 
 134. See id. at 227. 
 135. Id. at 229. 
 136. Id. at 228 (quoting St. Augustine High Sch. v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 270 F. 
Supp. 767, 773 (E.D. La. 1967)) (emphasis added). 
 137. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.4. 
 138. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (quoting NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 n.13 (1988)). 
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St. Augustine case, perceptively anticipated that such public/private 
distinctions might come into play in this area of state actor analysis. 
The very notion, however, that private school athletes may not have 
remedies against the state’s athletic association but that these ath-
letes’ public school competitors may have remedies is incongruous at 
best. It makes no sense to make the type of school the dispositive is-
sue. Clearly, the Sixth Circuit has lost focus in state actor analysis 
when it scrutinizes only the aggrieved party’s actions rather than the 
respective actions of the alleged wrongdoer—specifically in this case, 
the actions of the athletic association and the state. As will be evi-
dent, there are more problems to Brentwood’s analysis of footnote 
13 than this. 
4. Controlling yet unpersuasive within its own Sixth Circuit: The 
fallout of Brentwood’s treatment of footnote 13 
Within a few months after the Brentwood decision, a district 
court within the Sixth Circuit determined that Michigan’s high 
school athletic association was a state actor. In Communities for Eq-
uity (“Equity”) v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n 
(“MHSAA”),139 a group of female athletes, citing forms of alleged 
discrimination, brought a class action against the MHSAA. Natu-
rally, this was a Title IX case, and, therefore, the Equity court’s 
analysis focused on whether the MHSAA was a federal fund recipi-
ent. (Such analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.) The court, 
however, did engage in state actor analysis for Equal Protection and 
§ 1983 purposes, which is within the scope of this Note. To deter-
mine whether the MHSAA was a state actor, the district court natu-
rally applied the controlling three tests.140 Despite the binding prece-
dent of the Sixth Circuit in Brentwood, this lower district court held 
that the MHSAA was a state actor (1) because the MHSSA failed 
both the Nexus test141 and the weakened, but still intact, Mutual 
Contacts or “catch-all” test;142 (2) because a vast majority of circuit 
 
 139. 80 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 140. See id. at 739. See supra Part II.A for a refresher on the three dominant tests applied 
to find state action. 
 141. See id. at 739 (holding that the state coerced or encouraged the MHSAA because 
the MHSAA acts at the will of its representative local districts, which are governed primarily by 
state employees). 
 142. See id. at 739–40 (holding that there was a sufficiently close nexus of action be-
tween the state and the MHSAA because (1) the MHSAA is made up primarily of public 
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courts had so held;143 and (3) because, in its view, Brentwood’s 
analysis was irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s Tarkanian foot-
note 13.144 
To show how irreconcilable the Brentwood court’s treatment of 
Tarkanian’s footnote 13 was, the Equity district court explained that: 
[t]he Tarkanian case required the Supreme Court to examine two 
independent state actor questions. First, the Supreme Court was 
required to briefly analyze in what instances an athletic association 
might be considered a state actor because its members controlled 
the association and those members were state actors. (“The mem-
bership question”). Second, the Supreme Court examined in what 
instances an athletic association should be considered a state actor 
when it engages in joint activity with the state. (“The joint action 
question”). With these independent inquiries in mind, Footnote 13 
appears to stand for three propositions. First, an athletic association 
made up of schools from across the country, the majority of which 
are private schools, is not a state actor because no one state con-
trols the policy of the association. Second, if an association were 
made up of schools from the same state, and the majority of those 
schools were public, the association might well be a state actor. 
Third, while “joint action” between a public school and a private 
association might render the private association a state actor, joint 
action between a private school and a private association would 
not.145 
Ultimately, the court in Equity factually distinguished the case 
before them from the pertinent facts that were presented to the 
Brentwood court. Because Brentwood was a private school, rather 
 
schools (617 public and 114 private), (2) public employees oversee the MHSAA, (3) school 
employees who serve on the MHSAA Representative Council must have approval from their 
principal or superintendent, (4) the Michigan Superintendent of Public Instruction is ex-officio 
member of the Representative Council, and (5) the MHSAA influences and controls interscho-
lastic rules and policies). 
 143. See id. at 742. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. Less than one month later, in Michigan’s neighboring state of Indiana, the Sev-
enth Circuit’s United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, which, of 
course, was not bound by the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood decision, agreed with the Equity 
court’s persuasive characterization of Brentwood’s Tarkanian analysis when it stated that “there 
appears to be a serious disconnect between Tarkanian and the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Brentwood Academy.” Pearson v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. IP 99-1857-C-T/G, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11913 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2000) (citing Communities for Equity v. 
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D. Mich. 2000)). 
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than a public school as in Equity, the Sixth Circuit’s holding and 
analysis was strictly limited to only the circumstances of “a private 
school alleging that a state athletic association is a state actor when it 
regulates that private school . . . .”146 The students in Equity, how-
ever, attended a public school that was alleging that a state athletic 
association is a state actor when it regulates that public (not private) 
school. 
This factual distinction highlights a dangerous turn in state actor 
jurisprudence. Rather than scrutinizing the traditional characteristics 
and actions of the alleged private entity/state actor (e.g., the state 
athletic association, or in the Blum case, the nursing homes) the 
Sixth Circuit’s Tarkanian reliance appears to be embracing a broader 
scope of inquiry that unduly focuses on the party complaining of 
some wrongdoing (e.g., students and staff at Brentwood Academy, 
or by implication in the Blum case, the Medicaid patients). Under 
the Brentwood court’s application of Tarkanian footnote 13, we are 
presented with the inequitable potentiality that a state athletic asso-
ciation such as TSSAA could discriminate against private school ath-
letes on the basis of race, gender, or religion while these same asso-
ciations could not so discriminate at public schools. Clearly, the 
focus on the type of school attended obscures the real object of in-
quiry—that of the alleged private entity/state actor. 
V. BRENTWOOD GONE AWRY: WHERE STATE ACTION 
JURISPRUDENCE FAILS 
The most glaring gap in the Sixth Circuit’s analysis lies in the fact 
that the opinion never addresses or even gives lip service to all the 
other federal circuits that have always come out on the other side of 
this issue. Of course, this court is only bound by its own and the Su-
preme Court’s precedent; however, this court’s unwillingness to even 
distinguish its analysis from the other circuits shows a lack of analyti-
cal depth. Perhaps its lacking, however, is more appropriately placed 
squarely on the shoulders of its play caller—the Supreme Court. 
A. The Supreme Court and the Blum Trilogy 
Although the Supreme Court appears to apply three tests to de-
termine whether a private entity is state actor, in reality, it only ap-
 
 146. Equity, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 742–43. 
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plies two tests. The third test—Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” (or, 
in Sixth Circuit vernacular, Symbiotic) test—has no bite. For exam-
ple, in both Blum and Rendell-Baker147 the Supreme Court contin-
ued to outline this test’s factors such as (1) state licensing and regu-
lation of the private entity; (2) state subsidies or aid to the private 
entity; and (3) the amount of “symbiosis” or “entanglement” be-
tween the state and the private entity. Then the Court’s majority 
whittles away the significance of these factors, and, in the end, dis-
misses any or all of them as inconsequential. Just in Blum, for exam-
ple, the Court accepted that New York (1) heavily regulated the 
nursing care industry; (2) heavily subsidized over 90% of the care in 
this industry with its Medicaid program; and (3) generally recog-
nized that there was a heavy dose of symbiosis between the physi-
cians and the state program. However, this was not enough to trig-
ger this third and lowest standard test. When one considers the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of this test, it is no wonder the Brent-
wood court felt compelled to only give lip service to it. 
Although the first test (the Public Function test) does not apply 
in the Brentwood case, it too has inherent limitations that the Su-
preme Court has yet to address. First of all, it is so narrow in scope, 
it is no wonder that it does not apply to Brentwood: it can rarely ap-
ply to anything. When one considers just how narrow the Court has 
construed this test (e.g., running elections and police and fire protec-
tion), it is no small wonder that the 1940’s New Deal programs and 
the 1960’s social welfare programs such as Medicaid do not reach 
the Court’s conception of this test. This test, in effect, is frozen in 
the traditional government of the nineteenth century, and no matter 
how increasingly intrusive the state may, through private entities, act 
in our lives, the judiciary has given the state license to do so with its 
“frozen” concept of state action. The Public Function test is so fro-
zen in the last century that even each of the fifty state’s statutory 
duty to provide each citizen’s constitutionally recognized property 
interest in a free and appropriate education is not enough to trigger 
this public function test.148 
Thus, in short, the Supreme Court is encouraging the Courts of 
Appeals to, in practical effect, only apply one test—the Nexus Test. 
Worthy of note, however, is just how much this test has effectively 
 
 147. See supra Part II.B.1-2. 
 148. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982). 
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been limited. It takes a government entity’s covert or overt encour-
agement or coercion aimed at a private entity to trigger the charac-
terization of that targeted private entity as “state actor.”149 Given 
how the Supreme Court worked around the Second Circuit’s hold-
ing of state action in Blum by re-characterizing the facts underlying 
its holding,150 it should come as no surprise that the Sixth Circuit 
does the same. As you may recall, the district court, when it held that 
the actions of TSSAA constituted state action, found it significant 
that the Tennessee State Board of Education still substantially influ-
enced the TSSAA. The Sixth Circuit simply ignored this potentially 
condemning fact under this second test, which measures coercion, 
encouragement, or even direction. This head-in-the-sand approach 
appears to be consistent with the Brentwood court’s modus operandi 
at distinguishing itself from all the other persuasive circuits—it just 
ignores them. 
B. Lack of Predictability 
Lack of predictability is another troubling hallmark in state ac-
tion law. Essentially, because the courts have these three flexible tests 
that they shape around the facts on a case-by-case basis, the state ac-
tion area of the law is quite unpredictable and confusing. To high-
light this confusion, consider the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts’ dilemma in its respective dispositions of 
the Blum Trilogy’s Rendell-Baker case.151 
Before the terminated vocational teacher’s and the other five 
teacher’s respective cases were joined, they were tried as two separate 
cases. In the vocational teacher’s case, the district judge granted 
summary judgment to the defendant school because he found no 
requisitely close nexus between the school and the state.152 On the 
other hand, “[n]ine days earlier . . . a different judge of [the same 
court] reached a contrary conclusion on the same question in the 
case brought by the other five petitioners.”153 This judge denied 
summary judgment to the defendant school because its dependency 
 
 149. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 150. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982), for specifics on how the Supreme 
Court narrowed the scope of the lower court’s factual findings to avoid finding state action. 
 151. See supra Part II.B.2 for more background on this case. 
 152. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 835–36. 
 153. Id. at 836. 
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on state funds and state regulation, “although . . . not a uniquely 
public function, [] [was] primarily a public function.”154 So, in short, 
one judge failed to see how this private vocational school could be 
considered a state actor under the lowest test bar, while another 
judge, on the same court, held this same school under the very same 
factual pattern to be a state actor under the highest test bar. In other 
words, predictability, schmadictability.155 
C. The Hands-off or Judicial Restraint Approach 
In its last few analytical sentences, the Brentwood court permits 
an insightful glimpse into just why it, perhaps, has so narrowly (or, 
arguably not at all) applied the state action tests to TSSAA in two 
words—judicial restraint. Specifically, the court states: “[w]e are not 
super referees over high school athletic programs . . . . [even though 
such] competition may loom large in the eyes of youths, even par-
ents. . . . these issues are not of constitutional magnitude.”156 The 
court goes on to recognize Brentwood Academy’s legitimate con-
cern that vague TSSAA rules (i.e., “undue influence”) may lead to 
arbitrary enforcement, but the court states that such concerns should 
be resolved among the TSSAA’s compositional membership and not 
in the federal courts.157 
As a general practice, it may be praiseworthy for the courts to ex-
ercise judicial restraint in the area of education. Keeping judicial in-
tervention at a minimum because schools themselves are better 
equipped at devising rules158 is, perhaps, a noble stance. Because of 
this stance, the Brentwood court basically “remanded” this decision 
back to TSSAA when it suggested that TSSAA membership should 
resolve this issue.159 Upon “remand,” however, what remedy may 
Brentwood Academy realistically expect from TSSAA? Private 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See infra Part VII.B.2 for additional analysis explaining why the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of the Brentwood case will further decrease predictability in state action law. 
 156. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (citing Hardy v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 759 F.2d 1233, 1235 (5th Cir. 
1985)). See, e.g., Pierguidi, supra note 11, at 493 (noting the significance of the federal judici-
ary’s hands-off approach in athletics). 
 157. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 766. 
 158. See In re United States ex rel. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 682 F.2d 147, 
153 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 159. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 766. 
16DREW.DOC 1/3/02  2:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1342 
schools have little, if any, political influence on TSSAA, especially 
since the Board is exclusively comprised of public school administra-
tors.160 If anything, these same public school administrators, who 
sought to level the playing field by enforcing the recruiting rule 
against the Academy, now have judicial license to arbitrarily or dis-
criminatorily make any rules no matter how egregious or unfair they 
may be. Ultimately, TSSAA is a monopolistic entity (like so many of 
its sister organizations in Tennessee’s sister states), and if Brentwood 
wants to play in interscholastic athletics, it will just have to keep tak-
ing TSSAA’s hits, no matter how capricious TSSAA’s rules may be. 
Unless, of course, this term’s Supreme Court rules otherwise.161 
D. A Possible Solution 
Rather than gambling with these state action tests, which more 
often than not tend to smack of outcome determinative judgments, 
perhaps the courts should adopt one test. At the very least, the 
courts should adopt one test that offers judges an opportunity to 
show what they are weighing behind their application of these three 
limited state action tests. One such approach is a balancing test.162 
If judges were to implement a balancing test, they would weigh 
two items—rights against practices. If the value of a legitimate right 
(e.g., First Amendment, Due Process, etc.) outweighs the value of 
the private entity’s challenged practice (e.g., athletic rule making, 
Medicaid implementing, etc.) then the practice violates the constitu-
tional amendment at issue, and the state (either covertly or overtly) 
is allowing the practice to limit this right when it should not. Con-
versely, if the value of a right is not clearly greater that the chal-
lenged practice’s value, then the practice does not violate the 
amendment at issue, and the state is not allowing a practice to con-
tinue that it should not.163 As critics of the three-test approach have 
noted: 
While the balancing has nothing to do with finding a minimum 
quantum of state activity, the process of sorting out proscribed ac-
 
 160. See id. at 762. 
 161. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Oct. 11, 2000. See Jeff Lockridge, 
Football Started Free Speech Case: Brentwood Academy Case Moves to Supreme Court, 
TENNESSEAN, Oct. 8, 2000, at 12W. 
 162. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 819. 
 163. Id. 
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tivities has occurred under the guise of a formulistic search for an 
undefined minimum of state acts. In practice, when the challenged 
practice deserved state protection the Court has ruled that state ac-
tion is lacking, declaring in effect that the practice is compatible 
with the Fourteenth Amendment. [Ruling the other way,] the 
Court has found sufficient state action, which made easy a final rul-
ing of unconstitutionality.164 
In other words, when courts desire to protect a right, they bend 
the analysis to find state action. And, of course, they bend the analy-
sis the other way to protect a private entity’s state practice. Judges 
are informally weighing these rights-versus-practices items while they 
contemporaneously “apply” the three traditional tests anyway. 
Rather than doing so under the guise of these formulaic tests, 
judges, under a balancing approach, would weigh openly what they 
are weighing privately. Of course, this approach may not totally 
eliminate the lack of predictability problem. Nevertheless, it is a step 
in the right direction; over time, practitioners would necessarily get a 
sense of just how heavily courts weigh some rights versus others. 
Some observers have noted that the Supreme Court, in the inter-
ests of flexibility, already applies an informal or “unprincipled”165 
balancing test. For instance, when the Court searches for the pres-
ence of state action in a fundamental equal protection case, “such as 
the right to buy property asserted in Shelley, the Court will go to 
great lengths to find state action.”166 When the Court, however, 
searches for the presence of state action in a due process case, par-
ticularly a due process case that might modify the property rights of 
businesspersons, the Court is reluctant to find state action “even in 
the face of formal links between the state and the private actor.”167 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the purposes of predictability, unfortunately, the Brentwood 
case does not fit squarely into the Court’s informal equal protection-
due process paradigm. With its high regard for flexibility still intact, 
however, the Brentwood court could, of course, apply the more 
 
 164. Id. at 819–20. 
 165. See Sue Davis, The Supreme Court: Finding State Action . . . Sometimes, 26 HOW. 
L.J. 1395, 1423 (1983). 
 166. Id. at 1422–23. 
 167. Id. 
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formal balancing approach that this observer advocates. If the Court 
adopted such an approach in the Brentwood case, the Court would 
weigh, among other factors, the value of Brentwood Academy’s First 
Amendment right to send letters to or telephone its accepted stu-
dents against the value of TSSAA’s need to uniformly enforce its re-
cruiting rule. After developing an appropriate level of factual inquiry 
and analyzing the value of the former’s right against the value of the 
latter’s challenged practice, the court could reach a conclusion which 
would informatively instruct just how the court values the competing 
interests in this area. This balancing approach would be consistent 
with the approach for which Justice Brennan opined when he de-
clared, “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the 
nonobvious involvement of the state in private conduct be attributed 
its true significance.”168 
Ultimately, this term’s Supreme Court must sift, weigh, and de-
termine if its Blum-Trilogy-dominated, state action tests’ pendulum 
will continue to swing toward elevating form over substance. State 
interscholastic athletic associations and their public school and pri-
vate school constituents await the Court’s decision with interest. 
VII. POSTSCRIPT: AWAIT NO LONGER 
After this Note was accepted for publication and while it neared 
completion of the editing process, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 deci-
sion, reversed the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood decision and held that 
TSSAA’s “regulatory activity may and should be treated as state ac-
tion owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in 
the structure of the association . . . .”169 Although the Supreme 
Court has ultimately resolved the circuit split on whether a state in-
terscholastic athletic association may be sued for constitutional or § 
1983 violations, the high Court muddies nearly as many issues as it 
clarifies. 
A. A Sigh of Relief 
At least for the moment, substance, albeit narrowly, has trumped 
over form in determining whether a private entity is a state actor. 
 
 168. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (emphasis added). 
 169. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 99-901, 2001 U.S. 
LEXIS 964, at *6 (Feb. 20, 2001) (emphasis added). 
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Justice Souter, writing for the narrow majority,170 essentially echoed 
this author’s concern that the Court’s recent failures to apply a Mu-
tual Contacts (now denominated by yet another name—
“entwinement”171) test with real teeth172 paves the way for empty 
formalistic measures to determine state action.173 Unlike the four dis-
senters174 who essentially followed the Sixth Circuit’s formalistic ap-
proach,175 Justice Souter’s majority substantively recognized TSSAA 
as a state actor (1) because public schools comprised 84% of 
TSSAA’s voting membership,176 whose representatives met during 
school hours just as often as not;177 (2) because the State Board of 
Education’s 1996 removal of the Board’s 1972 “designation” of 
TSSAA as “the organization to supervise and regulate the athletic ac-
tivities in which the public junior and senior high schools of Tennes-
see participate on an interscholastic basis,”178 “affected nothing but 
words [because] . . . . [t]he most one can say . . . is that the State 
Board once freely acknowledged the Association’s official character 
but now does it by winks and nods”;179 (3) because the Sixth Circuit 
gave such “short shrift to the language from Tarkanian”180 when, in 
fact, the dictum in Tarkanian expressly pointed out the likelihood of 
finding state action where an organization’s constituent members are 
public schools all within the same state;181 and (4) because the 
Court, in its first footnote, implicitly gave deferential consideration 
 
 170. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court. See Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *5–*6. As in so 
many areas of constitutional law, it appears that Justice O’Connor again provides the swing 
vote, this time to the “liberal” side of the Court. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas 
Died: Affirmative Action’s Posthumous Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1996, at 21. 
 171. Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *15–*30. 
 172. See supra Part V.A. 
 173. Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *24 n.4. 
 174. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ken-
nedy, wrote the dissenting opinion. See id. at *30. 
 175. See id. at *32–*41. See supra Part IV for a reminder on how the adoption of a more 
formalistic approach, explicitly and impliedly endorsed by the dissenters, creates a method of 
analysis which all but ignores the underlying realities between private and state actors. 
 176. Id. at *7, *19. 
 177. Id. at *21. 
 178. Id. at *9 (citing Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Rule 0520-1-2.26 (later moved to Rule 0520-
1-2.08)). 
 179. Id. at *23–*24 (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. at *12. 
 181. See supra Part IV.B. 
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to the great weight of cumulative precedent that has consistently 
held state athletic associations to be state actors.182 In short, the ma-
jority’s conception of the third state action test at least elevates sub-
stance or “underlying reality” over mere formality.183 
The dissent, on the other hand, applied basically the same cur-
sory analysis that the Sixth Circuit applied.184 When Justice Thomas, 
under the Mutual Contacts [or Symbiotic] test, inquired into the 
substance of the relationship between TSSAA and the state, he 
“analogously” relegated the role of TSSAA to that of “a vendor 
[that] could contract with public schools to sell refreshments at 
school events.”185 Naturally, TSSAA may take the form of a vendor 
at an athletic event; however, TSSAA, in substance, is much more 
than a common refreshment vendor when it comes to the underlying 
reality prevalent among Tennessee’s interscholastic athletic pro-
grams. Again, similar to the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, form trumped 
substance under the dissent’s approach. 
B. Some Lingering “Muddy” Issues 
1. Entwinement 
Justice Thomas, for the dissent, perhaps justifiably laments that 
the “majority does not define [its new] ‘entwinement [test],’ and the 
meaning of the term is not altogether clear.”186 As noted previ-
ously,187 the sheer number of state action test labels tossed about in 
state action jurisprudence, particularly under the Mutual Contacts 
“catch-all” test, is unnecessary. With Brentwood, the Court adds yet 
one more theory into the mix. Moreover, “[b]ecause the majority 
never defines ‘entwinement,’ the scope of its holding is unclear.”188 
The dissent hopes that this entwinement test’s future is dim, and 
that, at best, its scope never grows beyond the fact-intensive applica-
 
 182. See Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *12 n.1. 
 183. See id. at *24 n.4. 
 184. Compare id. at *36–*41 (Thomas, J., dissenting) with Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 763–67 (6th Cir. 1995). See supra Part IV. 
 185. Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *41 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 186. Id. at *42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 187. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 188. Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *47 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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tion it received in Brentwood’s state athletic association context.189 
Of course, the dissent’s trouble with the term entwinement may 
only be a battle over parsing semantics because it may be asserted 
that the entwinement test is not a new test at all. Rather it is just one 
more denotation or synonym which may join all the other “catch-
all” terms such as entanglement, symbiotic, joint action, etc., under 
the Mutual Contacts umbrella.190 Just why the majority chose to use 
the term entwinement over other previously applied state action 
terms, such as entanglement, is unclear. 
2.  Lack of predictability revisited191 
Although, on the whole, a Mutual Contacts test with real bite in 
its application is preferable to an empty, formalistic conception of the 
test, the Mutual Contacts test’s detractors may now lament an even 
greater loss of predictability in state action law. For instance, despite 
all of its shortcomings, the developing Blum Trilogy192 trend had at 
least one redeeming virtue—budding predictability. Prior to Brent-
wood, only the limited Nexus [compulsion/coercion] test appeared 
to have any bite in its application because the Public Function test 
could only be applied in factually limited circumstances and because 
the Mutual Contacts test had all but been put to rest in the wake of 
the Blum Trilogy.193 With Brentwood, the Blum Trilogy’s predict-
ability has been cut back. Just when the circuits were beginning to 
sense some stasis,194 albeit heavily formalistic, the Supreme Court 
adds teeth to a test whose bite was all but gone. Held in the light of 
the past twenty or so years of Blum Trilogy application, the 5-4 
Brentwood decision sends, at best, mixed state action signals to the 
lower federal courts. Ultimately, the Court fortuitously holds that 
substance should triumph over form in state action jurisprudence but 
at the expense of some measure of stasis. Perhaps the only sure thing 
in this area of constitutional law is uncertainty. 
Josiah N. Drew 
 
 189. See id. 
 190. See supra note 16. 
 191. See supra Part V.B. 
 192. See supra note 31. 
 193. See supra Part V.A. 
 194. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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